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One goal of statistical privacy research is to construct a data release mechanism that
protects individual privacy while preserving information content. An example is a
random mechanism that takes an input database X and outputs a random database Z
according to a distribution Qn(·|X). Differential privacy is a particular privacy re-
quirement developed by computer scientists in which Qn(·|X) is required to be insen-
sitive to changes in one data point in X . This makes it difficult to infer from Z whether
a given individual is in the original database X . We consider differential privacy from
a statistical perspective. We consider several data release mechanisms that satisfy the
differential privacy requirement. We show that it is useful to compare these schemes
by computing the rate of convergence of distributions and densities constructed from
the released data. We study a general privacy method, called the exponential mecha-
nism, introduced by McSherry and Talwar (2007). We show that the accuracy of this
method is intimately linked to the rate at which the probability that the empirical dis-
tribution concentrates in a small ball around the true distribution.
1 Introduction
One goal of data privacy research is to derive a mechanism that takes an input database X and
releases a transformed database Z such that individual privacy is protected yet information content
is preserved. This is known as disclosure limitation. In this paper we will consider various methods
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for producing a transformed database Z and we will study the accuracy of inferences from Z under
various loss functions.
There are numerous approaches to this problem. The literature is vast and includes papers from
computer science, statistics and other fields. The terminology also varies considerably. We will
use the terms “disclosure limitation” and “privacy guarantee” interchangeably.
Disclosure limitation methods include clustering (Sweeney, 2002, Aggarwal et al., 2006), ℓ-
diversity (Machanavajjhala et al., 2006), t-closeness (Li et al., 2007), data swapping (Fienberg and McIntyre,
2004), matrix masking (Ting et al., 2008), cryptographic approaches (Pinkas, 2002, Feigenbaum et al.,
2006), data perturbation (Evfimievski et al., 2004, Kim and Winkler, 2003, Warner, 1965, Fienberg et al.,
1998) and distributed database methods (Fienberg et al., 2007, Sanil et al., 2004). Statistical refer-
ences on disclosure risk and limitation include Duncan and Lambert (1986, 1989), Duncan and Pearson
(1991), Reiter (2005). We refer to Reiter (2005) and Sanil et al. (2004) for further references.
One approach to defining a privacy guarantee that has received much attention in the computer
science literature is known as differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006, Dwork, 2006). There is a
large body of work on this topic including, for example, Dinur and Nissim (2003), Dwork and Nissim
(2004), Blum et al. (2005), Dwork et al. (2007), Nissim et al. (2007), Barak et al. (2007), McSherry and Talwar
(2007), Blum et al. (2008), Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008). Blum et al. (2008) gives a machine
learning approach to inference under differential privacy constraints and to some extent our results
are inspired by that paper. Smith (2008) shows how to provide efficient point estimators while
preserving differential privacy. He constructs estimators for parametric models with mean squared
error (1 + o(1))/(nI(θ)) where I(θ) is the Fisher information. Machanavajjhala et al. (2008) con-
sider privacy for histograms by sampling from the posterior distribution of the cell probabilities.
We discuss Machanavajjhala et al. (2008) further in Section 4. After submitting the first draft of
this paper, new work has appeared on differential privacy that is also statistical in nature, namely,
Ghosh et al. (2009), Dwork and Lei (2009), Dwork et al. (2009), Feldman et al. (2009).
The goals of this paper are to explain differential privacy in statistical language, to show how to
compare different privacy mechanisms by computing the rate of convergence of distributions and
densities based on the released data Z, and to study a general privacy method, called the exponen-
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tial mechanism, due to McSherry and Talwar (2007). We show that the accuracy of this method is
intimately linked to the rate at which the probability that the empirical distribution concentrates in
a small ball around the true distribution. These so called “small ball probabilities” are well-studied
in probability theory. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a connection has been
made between differential privacy and small ball probabilities. We need to make two disclaimers.
First, the goal of our paper is to investigate differential privacy. We will not attempt to review all
approaches to privacy or to compare differential privacy with other approaches. Such an under-
taking is beyond the scope of this paper. Second, we focus only on statistical properties here. We
shall not concern ourselves in this paper with computational efficiency.
In Section 2 we define differential privacy and provide motivation for the definition. In Section
3 we discuss conditions that ensure that a privacy mechanism preserves information. In Section 4
we consider two histogram based methods. In Section 5 and 6, we examine another method known
as the exponential mechanism. Section 7 contains a small simulation study and Section 8 contains
concluding remarks. All technical proofs appear in Section 9.
1.1 Summary of Results
We consider several different data release mechanisms that satisfy differential privacy. We evaluate
the utility of these mechanisms by evaluating the rate at which d(P, PZ) goes to 0, where P is
the distribution of the data X ∈ X , PZ is the empirical distribution of the released data Z, and
d is some distance between distributions. This gives an informative way to compare data release
mechanisms. In more detail, we consider the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) distance: supx∈X |F (x)−
F̂Z(x)|, where F , F̂Z denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) corresponding to P and the
empirical distribution function corresponding to PZ , respectively. We also consider the squared L2
distance:
∫
(p(x)− p̂Z)2, where p̂Z is a density estimator based on Z. Our results are summarized
in the following tables, where n denotes the sample size.
The first table concerns the case where the data are in Rr and the density p of P is Lipschitz.
Also reported are the minimax rates of convergence for density estimators in KS and in squared L2
distances. We see that the accuracy depends both on the data releasing mechanism and the distance
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function d. The results are from Sections 4 and 5 of the paper. (The exponential mechanism under
L2 distance is marked NA but is in the second table in case r = 1. We note that the rate for KS
distance for perturbed histogram is
√
logn/n for r = 1.)
Data Release mechanism
Distance smoothed perturbed exponential minimax
histogram histogram mechanism rate
L2 n
−2/(2r+3) n−2/(2+r) NA n−2/(2+r)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
√
log n× n−2/(6+r) log n× n−2/(2+r) n−1/3 n−1/2
The next table summarizes the results for the case where the dimension of X is r = 1 and the
density p is assumed to be in a Sobolev space of order γ. We only consider the squared L2 distance
between the true density p and the estimated density p̂Z in this case. The results are from Section
6 of the paper.
exponential perturbed orthogonal minimax rate
mechanism series estimator
L2 n
−γ/(2γ+1) n−2γ/(2γ+1) n−2γ/(2γ+1)
Our results show that, in general, privacy schemes seem not to yield minimax rates. Two
exceptions are perturbation methods evaluated under L2 loss which do yield minimax rates. An
open question is whether the slower than minimax rates are intrinsic to the privacy methods. It is
possible, for example, that our rates are not tight. This question could be answered by establishing
lower bounds on these rates. We consider this an important topic for future research.
2 Differential Privacy
Let X1, . . . , Xn be a random sample (independent and identically distributed) of size n from a
distribution P where Xi ∈ X . To be concrete, we shall assume that X ≡ [0, 1]r = [0, 1] ×
[0, 1]× · · ·× [0, 1] for some integer r ≥ 1. Extensions to more general sample spaces are certainly
possible but we focus on this sample space to avoid unnecessary technicalities. (In particular, it
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is difficult to extend differential privacy to unbounded domains.) Let µ denote Lebesgue measure
and let p = dP/dµ if the density exists. We call X = (X1, . . . , Xn) a database. Note that
X ∈ X n = [0, 1]r × · · · × [0, 1]r. We focus on mechanisms that take a database X as input
and output a sanitized database Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) ∈ X k for public release. In general, Z need
not be the same size as X . For some schemes, we shall see that large k can lead to low privacy
and high accuracy while while small k can lead to high privacy and low accuracy. We will let
k ≡ k(n) change with n. Hence, any asymptotic statements involving n increasing will also allow
k to change as well.
A data release mechanism Qn(·|X) is a conditional distribution for Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) given
X . Thus, Qn(B|X = x) is the probability that the output database Z is in a set B ∈ B given that
the input database is x, where B are the measurable subsets of X k. We call Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) a
sanitized database. Schematically:
input database X = (X1, . . . , Xn)
Qn(Z|X)−−−−−→
sanitize
output database Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk).
The marginal distribution of the output databaseZ induced byP andQn isMn(B) =
∫
Qn(B|X =
x)dP n(x) where P n is the n-fold product measure of P .
Example 2.1. A simple example to help the reader have a concrete example in mind is adding
noise. In this case, Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) where Zi = Xi + ǫi and ǫ1, . . . , ǫn are mean 0 indepen-
dent observations drawn from some known distribution H with density h. Hence Qn has density
qn(z1, . . . , zn|x1, . . . , xn) =
∏n
i=1 h(zi − xi).
Definition 2.2. Given two databasesX = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), let δ(X, Y ) denote
the Hamming distance between X and Y : δ(X, Y ) = #
{
i : Xi 6= Yi
}
.
A general data release mechanism is the exponential mechanism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007)
which is defined as follows. Let ξ : X n × X k :→ [0,∞) be any function. Each such ξ defines a
different exponential mechanism. Let
∆ ≡ ∆n,k = sup
x,y∈Xn
δ(x,y)=1
sup
z∈Xk
|ξ(x, z)− ξ(y, z)|, (1)
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that is, ∆n,k is the maximum change to ξ caused by altering a single entry in x. Finally, let
(Z1, . . . , Zk) be a random vector drawn from the density
h(z|x) =
exp
(
−αξ(x,z)
2∆n,k
)
∫
Xk exp
(
−αξ(x,s)
2∆n,k
)
ds
(2)
where α ≥ 0, z = (z1, . . . , zk) and x = (x1, . . . , xn). In this case, Qn has density h(z|x). We’ll
discuss the exponential mechanism in more detail later.
There are many definitions of privacy but in this paper we focus on the following definition due
to Dwork et al. (2006) and Dwork (2006).
Definition 2.3. Let α ≥ 0. We say that Qn satisfies α-differential privacy if
sup
x,y∈Xn
δ(x,y)=1
sup
B∈B
Qn(B|X = x)
Qn(B|X = y) ≤ e
α (3)
where B are the measurable sets on X k. The ratio is interpreted to be 1 whenever the numerator
and denominator are both 0.
The definition of differential privacy is based on ratios of probabilities. It is crucial to measure
closeness by ratios of probabilities since that protects rare cases which have small probability
under Qn. In particular, if changing one entry in the database X cannot change the probability
distribution Qn(·|X = x) very much, then we can claim that a single individual cannot guess
whether he is in the original database or not. The closer eα is to 1, the stronger privacy guarantee
is. Thus, one typically chooses α close to 0. See Dwork et al. (2006) for more discussion on these
points. Indeed, suppose that two subjects each believe that one of them is in the original database.
Given Z and full knowledge of P and Qn can they test who is in X? The answer is given in the
following result. (In this result, we drop the assumption that the user does not know Qn.)
Theorem 2.4. Suppose thatZ is obtained from a data release mechanism that satisfiesα-differential
privacy. Any level γ test which is a function of Z, P and Qn of H0 : Xi = s versus H1 : Xi = t
has power bounded above by γeα.
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Thus, if Qn satisfies differential privacy then it is virtually impossible to test the hypothesis
that either of the two subjects is in the database since the power of such a test is nearly equal to
its level. A similar calculation shows that if one does a Bayes test between H0 and H1 then the
Bayes factor is always between e−2α and e2α. For more detail on the motivation for the definition
as well as consequences, see Dwork et al. (2006), Dwork (2006), Ganta et al. (2008), Rastogi et al.
(2009).
The following result, which is proved in McSherry and Talwar (2007) (Theorem 6), shows that
the exponential mechanism always preserves differential privacy.
Theorem 2.5. (McSherry and Talwar, 2007) The exponential mechanism satisfies the α-differential
privacy.
To conclude this section we record a few useful facts. Let T (X,R) be a function ofX and some
auxiliary random variable R which is independent of X . After including this auxiliary random
variable we define differential privacy as before. Specifically, T (X,R) satisfies differential privacy
if for allB, and all x, x′ with δ(x, x′) = 1 we have that P(T (X,R) ∈ B|X = x) ≤ eαP(T (X,R) ∈
B|X = x′). The third part is Proposition 1 from Dwork et al. (2006).
Lemma 2.6. We have the following:
1. If T (X,R) satisfies differential privacy then U = h(T (X,R)) also satisfies differential pri-
vacy for any measurable function h.
2. Suppose that g is a density function constructed from a random vector T (X,R) that satisfies
differential privacy. Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) be k iid draws from g. This defines a mechanism
Qn(B|X) = P(Z ∈ B|X). Then Qn satisfies differential privacy for any k.
3. (Proposition 1 from Dwork et al. (2006).) Let f(x) be a function of x = (x1, . . . , xn) and
define S(f) = supx,x′:δ(x,x′)=1 ‖f(x)− f(x′)‖1 where ‖a‖1 =
∑
j |aj|. Let R have density
g(r) ∝ e−α|r|/S(f). Then T (X,R) = f(X) +R satisfies differential privacy.
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3 Informative Mechanisms
A challenge in privacy theory is to find Qn that satisfies differential privacy and yet yields datasets
Z that preserve information. Informally, a mechanism is informative if it is possible to make
precise inferences from the released data Z1, . . . , Zk. Whether or not a mechanism is informative
will depend on the goals of the inference. From a statistical perspective, we would like to infer P
or functionals of P from Z. Blum et al. (2008) show that the probability content of some classes
of intervals can be estimated accurately while preserving privacy. Their results motivated the
current paper. We will assume throughout that the user has access to the sanitized data Z but
not the mechanism Qn. The question of how a data analyst can use knowledge of Qn to improve
inferences is left to future work.
There are many ways to measure the information in Z. One way is through distribution func-
tions. Let F denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) on X corresponding to P . Thus
F (x) = P (X ∈ (−∞, x1] × · · · × (−∞, xr]) where x = (x1, . . . , xr). Let F̂ ≡ F̂X denote the
empirical distribution function corresponding toX and similarly let F̂Z denote the empirical distri-
bution function corresponding to Z. Let ρ denote any distance measure on distribution functions.
Definition 3.1. Qn is consistent with respect to ρ if ρ(F, F̂Z) P→ 0. Qn is ǫn-informative if
ρ(F, F̂Z) = OP (ǫn).
An alternative to requiring ρ(F, F̂Z) to be small is to require ρ(F̂ , F̂Z) to be small. Or one could
require Qn(ρ(F̂ , F̂Z) > ǫ|X = x) be small for all x as in Blum et al. (2008). These requirements
are similar. Indeed, suppose ρ satisfies the triangle inequality and that F̂ is consistent in the ρ
distance, that is, ρ(F̂ , F ) P→ 0. Assume further that ρ(F̂ , F ) = OP (ǫn). Then ρ(F, F̂Z) = OP (ǫn)
implies that
ρ(F̂ , F̂Z) ≤ ρ(F̂ , F ) + ρ(F, F̂Z) = OP (ǫn);
Similarly, ρ(F̂ , F̂Z) = OP (ǫn) implies that ρ(F, F̂Z) = OP (ǫn).
Let EP,Qn denote the expectation under the joint distribution defined by P n and Qn. Sometimes
we write E when there is no ambiguity. Similarly, we use P to denote the marginal probability
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under P n and Qn: P(A) =
∫
A
dQn(z1, . . . , zk|x1, . . . , xn)dP (x1) · · ·dP (xn) for A ∈ X k.
There are many possible choices for ρ. We shall mainly focus on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) distance ρ(F,G) = supx |F (x) − G(x)| and the squared L2 distance ρ(F,G) =
∫
(f(x) −
g(x))2dx where f = dF/dµ and g = dG/dµ. However, our results can be carried over to other
distances as well.
Before proceeding let us note that we will need some assumptions on F otherwise we cannot
have a consistent scheme as shown in the following theorem. The following result — essentially a
re-expression of a result in Blum et al. (2008) in our framework — makes this clear.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that Qn satisfies differential privacy and that ρ(F,G) = supx |F (x) −
G(x)|. Let F be a point mass distribution. Thus F (y) = I(y ≥ x) for some point x ∈ [0, 1]. Then
F̂Z is inconsistent, that is, there is a δ > 0 such that lim infn→∞ P n(ρ(F, F̂Z) > δ) > 0.
4 Sampling From a Histogram
The goal of this section is to give two concrete, simple data release methods that achieve dif-
ferential privacy. The idea is to draw a random sample from histogram. The first scheme draws
observations from a smoothed histogram. The second scheme draws observations from a randomly
perturbed histogram. We use the histogram for its familiarity and simplicity and because it is used
in applications of differential privacy. We will see that the histogram has to be carefully con-
structed to ensure differential privacy. We then compare the two schemes by studying the accuracy
of the inferences from the released data. We will see that the accuracy depends both on how the
histogram is constructed and on what measure of accuracy we use.
Let L > 0 be a constant and suppose that p = dP/dµ ∈ P where
P =
{
p : |p(x)− p(y)| ≤ L||x− y||
}
(4)
is the class of Lipschitz functions. We assume throughout this section that p ∈ P . The minimax
rate of convergence for density estimators in squared L2 distance for P is n−2/(2+r) (Scott, 1992).
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Let h = hn be a binwidth such that 0 < h < 1 and such that m = 1/hr is an integer. Partition
X into m bins {B1, . . . , Bm} where each bin Bj is a cube with sides of length h. Let I(·) denote
the indicator function. Let f̂m denote the corresponding histogram estimator on X , namely,
f̂m(x) =
m∑
j=1
p̂j
hr
I(x ∈ Bj)
where p̂j = Cj/n and Cj =
∑n
i=1 I(Xi ∈ Bj) is the number of observations in Bj . Recall that f̂m
is a consistent estimator of p if h = hn → 0 and nhrn → ∞. Also, the optimal choice of m = mn
for L2 error under P is mn ≍ nr/(2+r), in which case
∫
(p− f̂m)2 = OP (n−2/(2+r)) (Scott, 1992).
Here, an ≍ bn means that both an/bn and bn/an are bounded for large n.
4.1 Sampling from a Smoothed Histogram
The first method for generating released data Z from a histogram while achieving differential
privacy proceeds as follows. Recall that the sample space is [0, 1]r. Fix a constant 0 < δ < 1 and
define the smoothed histogram
f̂m,δ(x) = (1− δ)f̂m(x) + δ. (5)
Theorem 4.1. Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) where Z1, . . . , Zk are k iid draws from f̂m,δ(x). If
k log
(
(1− δ)m
nδ
+ 1
)
≤ α (6)
then α-differential privacy holds.
Note that for δ → 0 and m
nδ
→ 0, log
(
(1−δ)m
nδ
+ 1
)
= m
nδ
(1 + o(1)) ≈ m
nδ
. Thus (6) is
approximately the same as requiring
mk
δ
≤ nα. (7)
Equation (7) shows an interesting tradeoff between m, k and δ. We note that sampling from
the usual histogram corresponding to δ = 0 does not preserve differential privacy.
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Now we consider how to choose m, k, δ to minimize E(ρ(F, F̂Z)) while satisfying (6). Here, E
is the expectation under the randomness due to sampling from P and due to the privacy mechanism
Qn. Thus, for any measurable function h,
E(h(Z)) =
∫ ∫
h(z1, . . . , zk)dQn(z1, . . . , zk|x1, . . . , xn)dP (x1) · · · dP (xn).
Now we give a result that shows how accurate the inferences are in the KS distance using the
smoothed histogram sampling scheme.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that Z1, . . . , Zk are drawn as described in the previous theorem. Sup-
pose (4) holds. Let ρ be the KS distance. Then choosing m ≍ nr/(6+r), k ≍ m4/r = n4/(6+r) and
δ = (mk/nα) minimizes Eρ(F, F̂Z) subject to (6). In this case, Eρ(F, F̂Z) = O
( √
logn
n2/(6+r)
)
.
In this case we see that we have consistency since ρ(F, F̂Z) = oP (1) but the rate is slower than
the minimax rate of convergence for density estimators in KS distance, which is n−1/2. Now let
q̂j = #{Zi ∈ Bj}/k and
ρ(F, F̂Z) =
∫
(p(x)− f̂Z(x))2dx, where f̂Z(x) = h−r
m∑
j=1
q̂jI(x ∈ Bj). (8)
Theorem 4.3. Assume the conditions of the previous theorem. Let ρ be the squared L2 distance as
defined in (8). Then choosing
m ≍ nr/(2r+3), k ≍ n(r+2)/(2r+3), δ ≍ n−1/(r+3)
minimizes Eρ(F, F̂Z) subject to (6). In this case, Eρ(F, F̂Z) = O(n−2/(2r+3)).
Again, we have consistency but the rate is slower than the minimax rate which is n−2/(2+r).
(Scott, 1992)
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4.2 Sampling From a Perturbed Histogram
The second method, which we call the sampling from a perturbed histogram, is due to Dwork et.
al. (2006). Recall that Cj is the number of observations in bin Bj . Let Dj = Cj + νj where
ν1, . . . , νm are independent, identically distributed draws from a Laplace density with mean 0 and
variance 8/α2. Thus the density of νj is g(ν) = (α/4)e−|ν|α/2. Dwork et. al. (2006) show that
releasing D = (D1, . . . , Dm) preserves differential privacy. However, our goal is to release a
database Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) rather than just a set of counts. Now define
D˜j = max{Dj , 0} and q̂j = D˜j/
∑
s
D˜s.
Since D preserves differential privacy, it follows from Lemma 2.6 that (q̂1, . . . , q̂m) also preserve
differential privacy; Moreover, any sample Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) from f˜(x) = h−r
∑m
j=1 q̂jI(x ∈ Bj)
preserve differential privacy for any k.
Theorem 4.4. Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) be drawn from f˜(x) = h−r
∑m
j=1 q̂jI(x ∈ Bj). Assume that
there exists a constant 1 ≤ C <∞ such that supx p(x) = C.
(1) Let ρ be the L2 distance and f̂Z be as defined in (8). Let m ≍ nr/(2+r) and let k ≥ n. Then we
have Eρ(F, F̂Z) = O(n−2/(2+r)).
(2) Let ρ be the KS distance. Let m ≍ nr/(2+r). Then Eρ(F, F̂Z) = O
(
min
(
logn
n2/(2+r)
,
√
logn
n
))
.
Hence, this method achieves the minimax rate of convergence in L2 while the first data release
method does not. This suggests that the perturbation method is preferable for the L2 distance.
The perturbation method does not achieve the minimax rate of convergence in KS distance; in
fact, the exponential mechanism based method achieves a better rate as we shown in Section 5
(Theorem 5.4). We examine this method numerically in Section 7.
Another approach to histograms is given by Machanavajjhala et al. (2008). They put a Dirichlet
(a1, . . . , am) prior on the cell probabilities p1, . . . , pm where pj = P(Xi ∈ Bj). The corresponding
posterior is Dirichlet (a1+C1, . . . , am+Cm). Next they draw q = (q1, . . . , qm) from the posterior
and finally they sample new cell counts D = (D1, . . . , Dm) from a Multinomial (k, q). Thus, the
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distribution of D given X is
P(D = d|X) =
∏m
j=1 Γ(dj + aj + Cj)
Γ(k + n+
∑
j aj)
.
They show that differential privacy requires aj + Cj ≥ k/(eα − 1) for all j. If we take
a1 = a2 = · · · = am then this is similar to the first histogram-based data release method we
discussed in this section. They also suggest a weakened version of differential privacy.
5 Exponential Mechanism
In this section we will consider the exponential mechanism in some detail. We’ll derive some gen-
eral results about accuracy and apply the method to the mean, and to density estimation. Specifi-
cally, we will show the following for exponential mechanisms:
1. Choosing the size k of the released database is delicate. Taking k too large compromises
privacy. Taking k too small compromises accuracy.
2. The accuracy of the exponential scheme can be bounded by a simple formula. This formula
has a term that measures how likely it is for a distribution based on sample size k, to be in
a small ball around the true distribution. In probability theory, this is known as a small ball
probability.
3. The formula can be applied to several examples such as the KS distance, the mean, and
nonparametric density estimation using orthogonal series. In each case we can use our results
to choose k and to find the rate of convergence of an estimator based on the sanitized data.
In light of Theorem 3.2, we know that some assumptions are needed on P . We shall assume
throughout this section that P has a bounded density p; note that this is a weaker condition than
(4).
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Recall the exponential mechanism. We draw the vector Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) from h(z|x) where
h(z|x) = gx(z)∫
[0,1]k
gx(s)ds
, where gx(z) = exp
(
−α ρ(F̂x, F̂z)
2∆n,k
)
and (9)
∆ ≡ ∆n,k = sup
x,y∈Xn
δ(x,y)=1
sup
z∈Xk
|ρ(F̂x, F̂z)− ρ(F̂y, F̂z)|.
Lemma 5.1. For KS distance ∆n,k ≤ 1n .
This framework is used in Blum et al. (2008). For the rest of this section, assume that Z =
(Z1, . . . , Zk) are drawn from an exponential mechanism Qn.
Definition 5.2. Let F denote the cumulative distribution function on X corresponding to P . Let
Ĝ denote the empirical cdf from a sample of size k from P , and let
R(k, ǫ) = P k(ρ(F, Ĝ) ≤ ǫ).
R(k, ǫ) is called the small ball probability associated with ρ.
The following theorem bounds the accuracy of the estimator from the sanitized data by a simple
formula involving the small ball probability.
Theorem 5.3. Assume that P has a bounded density p, and that there exists ǫn → 0 such that
P
(
ρ(F, F̂X) >
ǫn
16
)
= O
(
1
nc
)
(10)
for some c > 1. Further suppose that ρ satisfies the triangle inequality. Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) be
drawn from gx(z) given in (9). Then,
P
(
ρ(F, F̂Z) > ǫn
)
≤ (supx p(x))
k exp
(−3αǫn
16∆
)
R(k, ǫn/2)
+O
(
1
nc
)
. (11)
Thus, if we can choose k = kn in such a way that the right hand side of (11) goes to 0, then the
mechanism is consistent. We now show some examples that satisfy these conditions and we show
how to choose kn.
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5.1 The KS Distance
Theorem 5.4. Suppose that P has a bounded density p and let B := log supx p(x) > 0. Let
Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) be drawn from gx(z) given in (9) with ρ being the KS distance. By requiring
that kn ≍
(
3α
B
)2/3
n2/3, we have for ǫn = 2
(
B
3α
)1/3
n−1/3, and for ρ being the KS distance,
ρ(F, F̂Z) = OP (ǫn) . (12)
Note that ρ(F, F̂Z) converges to 0 at a slower rate than ρ(F, F̂X). We thus see that the rate after
sanitization is n−1/3 which is slower than the optimal rate of n−1/2. It is an open question whether
this rate can be improved.
5.2 The Mean
It is interesting to consider what happens when ρ(F, F̂Z) = ||µ − Z||2 where µ =
∫
xdP (x)
and Z is the sample mean of Z. In this case ∆ ≤ r/n. Thus, h(u|x) ≈ e−n||X−Z||2/(2α) so,
approximately, Z1, . . . , Zk ∼ N(X, kα/n). Indeed, it suffices to take k = 1 in this case since then
Z = X +OP (1/
√
n). Thus Z converges at the same rate as X . This is not surprising: preserving
a single piece of information requires a database of size k = 1.
6 Orthogonal Series Density Estimation
In this section, we develop an exponential scheme based on density estimation and we compare it
to the perturbation approach. For simplicity we take r = 1. Let {1, ψ1, ψ2, . . . , } be an orthonormal
basis for L2(0, 1) = {f :
∫ 1
0
f 2(x)dx <∞} and assume that p ∈ L2(0, 1). Hence
p(x) = 1 +
∞∑
j=1
βjψj(x) where βj =
∫ 1
0
ψj(x)p(x)dx.
15
We assume that the basis functions are uniformly bounded so that
c0 ≡ sup
j
sup
x
|ψj(x)| <∞. (13)
Let B(γ, C) denote the Sobolev ellipsoid
B(γ, C) =
{
β = (β1, β2, . . .) :
∞∑
j=1
β2j j
2γ ≤ C2
}
where γ > 1/2. Let
P(γ, C) =
{
p(x) = 1 +
∞∑
j=1
βjψj(x) : β ∈ B(γ, C)
}
.
The minimax rate of convergence in L2 norm for P(γ, C) is n−2γ/(2γ+1) (Efromovich, 1999). Thus
inf
bp
sup
P∈P(γ,C)
E
∫
(p̂(x)− p(x))2dx ≥ c1n−2γ/(2γ+1)
for some c1 > 0. This rate is achieved by the estimator
p̂(x) = 1 +
mn∑
j=1
β̂jψj(x) (14)
where mn = n1/(2γ+1) and β̂j = n−1
∑n
i=1 ψj(Xi). See Efromovich (1999).
For a function u ∈ L2(0, 1), let us define ‖u‖ℓ2 =
(∫ 1
0
|u(x)|2dx
)1/2
, which is a norm on
L2(0, 1). Now consider an exponential mechanism based on
ξ(X,Z) =
(∫
(p̂(x)− p̂∗(x))2 dx
)1/2
:= ‖p̂− p̂∗‖ℓ2 where (15)
p̂∗(x) = 1 +
mk∑
j=1
β̂∗jψj(x), for mk = k
1
2γ+1 and β̂∗j = k−1
k∑
i=1
ψj(Zi). (16)
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Lemma 6.1. Under the above scheme we have ∆ ≤ 2c20mn
n
for c0 as defined in (13). Hence,
g(z|x) = exp
(
−α ‖p̂
∗ − p̂‖ℓ2
∆
)
≤ exp
(
−αn ‖p̂
∗ − p̂‖ℓ2
2c20mn
)
almost surely. (17)
Theorem 6.2. Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) be drawn from gx(z) given in (17). Assume that γ > 1. If we
choose k ≍ √n then
ρ2(p, p̂∗) = OP
(
n−
γ
2γ+1
)
.
We conclude that the sanitized estimator converges at a slower rate than the minimax rate. Now
we compare this to the perturbation approach. Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) be an iid sample from
q̂(x) = 1 +
mn∑
j=1
(β̂j + νj)ψj(x)
where ν1, . . . , νm are iid draws from a Laplace distribution with density g(ν) = (nα/(2c0m))e−nα|ν|/(c0m).
Thus, i the notation of 2.6, R = (ν1, . . . , νm). It follows from Lemma 2.6 that, for any k,
this preserves differential privacy. If q̂(x) < 0 for any x then we replace q̂ by q̂(x)I(q̂(x) >
0)/
∫
q̂(s)I(q̂(s) > 0)ds as in Hall and Murison (1993).
Theorem 6.3. Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) be drawn from q̂. Assume that γ > 1. If we choose k ≥ n,
then
ρ2(p, p̂Z) = OP
(
n−
2γ
2γ+1
)
where p̂Z is the orthogonal series density estimator based on Z.
Hence, again, the perturbation technique achieves the minimax rate of convergence and so
appears to be superior to the exponential mechanism. We do not know if this is because the
exponential mechanism is inherently less accurate, or if our bounds for the exponential mechanism
are not tight enough.
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Figure 1: Top two plots n = 100. Bottom two plots n = 1, 000. Each plot shows the mean
integrated squared error of the histogram. The lower line is from the histogram based on the
original data. The upper line is based on the perturbed histogram.
7 Example
Here we consider a small simulation study to see the effect of perturbation on accuracy. We focus
on the histogram perturbation method with r = 1. We take the true density ofX to be a Beta(10,10)
density. We considered sample sizes n = 100 and n = 1, 000 and privacy levels α = 0.1, and
α = 0.01. We take ρ to be squared error distance. Figure 1 shows the results of 1,000 simulations
for various numbers of bins m.
As expected, smaller values of α induce a larger information loss which manifests itself as a
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larger mean squared error. Despite the fact that the perturbed histogram achieves the minimax rate,
the error is substantially inflated by the perturbation. This means that the constants in the risk are
important, not just the rate. Also, the risk of the sanitized histograms is much more sensitive to the
choice of the number of cells than the original histogram is.
We repeated the simulations with a bimodal density, namely, p(x) being an equal mixture of
a Beta(10,3) density and Beta(3,10) density. The results turned out to be nearly identical to those
above.
8 Conclusion
Differential privacy is an important type of privacy guarantee when releasing data. Our goal has
been to present the idea in statistical language and then to show that loss functions based on distri-
butions and densities can be useful for comparing privacy mechanisms.
We have seen that sampling from a histogram leads to differential privacy as long as either
the histogram is shifted away from 0 by a factor δ or if the cells are perturbed appropriately. The
latter method achieves a faster rate of convergence in L2 distance. But, the simulation showed
that the risk can nonetheless be quite large. This suggests that more work is needed to get precise
finite sample risk bounds. Also, the choice of the smoothing parameter (number of cells in the
histogram) has a larger effect on the sanitized histogram than on the original histogram.
We also studied the exponential mechanism. Here we derived a formula for assessing the
accuracy of the method. The formula involves small ball probabilities. As far as we know, the
connection between differential privacy and small ball probabilities has not been observed before.
Minimaxity is desirable for any statistical procedure. We have seen that in some cases the
minimax rate is achieved and in some cases it is not. We do not yet have a complete minimax
theory for differential privacy and this is the focus of our current work. We close with some open
questions.
1. When is it possible for ρ(F, F̂Z) to have the same rate as ρ(F, F̂X)?
2. When adaptive minimax methods are used, such as adapting to γ in Section 6 or when using
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wavelet estimation methods, is some form of adaptivity preserved after sanitization?
3. Many statistical methods involve some sort of risk minimization. A example is choosing a
bandwidth by cross-validation. What is the effect of sanitization on these procedures?
4. Are there other, better methods of sanitization that preserve differential privacy?
9 Proofs
9.1 Proof of Theorem 2.4
Without loss of generality take i = 1. Let M0(B) =
∫
Q(B|s, x2, . . . , xn) dP (x2, . . . , xn)
and M1(B) =
∫
Q(B|t, x2, . . . , xn)dP (x2, . . . , xn). By the Neyman-Pearson lemma, the highest
power test is to reject H0 when U > u where U(z) = (dM1/dM0)(z) and u is chosen so that∫
I(U(z) > u)dM0(z) ≤ γ. Since (s, x2, . . . , xn) and (t, x2, . . . , xn) differ in only one coordinate,
M1(B) ≤ eαM0(B) and so the power is M1(U > u) ≤ eαM0(U > u) ≤ γeα. 
9.2 Proof of Lemma 2.6
For the first part simply note that P(h(T (X,R)) ∈ B|X = x) = P(T (X,R) ∈ h−1(B)|X = x) ≤
eαP(T (X,R) ∈ h−1(B)|X = x′) = eαP(h(T (X,R)) ∈ B|X = x′).
For the second part, let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) and note that Z is independent of X given T (X,R).
Let H be the distribution of T (X,R). Hence,
P(Z ∈ B|X = x) =
∫
P(Z ∈ B|X = x, T = t)dH(t|X = x)dt
=
∫
P(Z ∈ B|T = t)dH(t|X = x)dt
=
∫
P(Z ∈ B|T = t) dH(t|X = x)
dH(t|X = x′)dH(t|X = x
′)
≤ eα
∫
P(Z ∈ B|T = t)dH(t|X = x′)
= eαP(Z ∈ B|X = x′).
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9.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Our proof is adapted from an argument given in Theorem 5.1. of Blum et al. (2008). Let r = 1
so that X = [0, 1]. Let P = δ0 where δ0 denotes a point mass at 0. Then P n(X = X(0)) = 1 where
X(0) ≡ {0, . . . , 0}. Assume that Qn is consistent. Since F (0) = 1, it follows that for any δ > 0,
P(F̂Z(0) > 1 − δ) → 1. But since P(·) = EPQn(·|X) and since P n(X = X(0)) = 1, this implies
that Qn(F̂Z(0) > 1− δ|X = X(0))→ 1.
Let v > 0 be any point in [0, 1] such that Qn(Z = v|X = X(0)) = 0. Let X(1) = {v, 0, . . . , 0},
X(2) = {v, v, 0, . . . , 0}, . . . , X(n) = {v, v, . . . , v}. By assumption, Qn(Z = X(j)|X = X(0)) = 0
for all j ≥ 1. Differential privacy implies that Qn(Z = X(j)|X = X(1)) = 0 for all j ≥ 1.
Applying differential privacy again implies that Qn(Z = X(j)|X = X(2)) = 0 for all j ≥ 1.
Continuing this way, we conclude that Qn(Z = X(j)|X = X(n)) = 0 for all j ≥ 1.
Next let P = δv. Arguing as before, we know that Qn(F̂Z(v) < 1 − δ|X = X(n)) → 0.
And since F (v−) = 0 we also have that Qn(F̂Z(v−) > δ|X = X(n)) → 0. Here, F (v−) =
limi→∞ F (vi) where v1 < v2 < . . . and vi → v. Hence, for j/n > 1 − δ, Qn(Z = X(j)|X =
X(n)) > 0 which is a contradiction. 
9.4 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Suppose that X differs from Y in at most one observation. Let f̂ denote the perturbed histogram
f̂m,δ based on X and let ĝm,δ denote the histogram based on Y , such that X and Y differ in one
entry. We also use p̂j(X) and p̂j(Y ) for cell proportions. Note that |p̂j(X) − p̂j(Y )| < 1/n by
definition. It is clear that the maximum density ratio for a single draw xi, or all i, occurs in one bin
Bj . Now consider x = (x1, . . . , xi) such that for all i = 1, . . . , k, we have xi ∈ Bj ⊂ [0, 1]r and
the following bounds.
1. Let p̂j(Y ) = 0; then in order to maximize f̂(x)/ĝ(x), we let p̂j(X) = 1/n and obtain
f̂(x)
ĝ(x)
=
k∏
i=1
f̂m,δ(xi)
ĝm,δ(xi)
≤
(
(1− δ)m(1/n) + δ
δ
)k
=
(
(1− δ)m
nδ
+ 1
)k
;
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2. Otherwise, we let p̂j(Y ) ≥ 1/n, (as by definition of p̂j , it takes z/n for non-negative integers
z) and let p̂j(X) = p̂j(Y )± 1/n. Now it is clear that in order to maximize the density ratio
at x, we may need to reverse the role of X and Y ,
max
(
ĝ(x)
f̂(x)
,
f̂(x)
ĝ(x)
)
≤ max
((
(1− δ)mp̂j + δ
(1− δ)m(p̂j − (1/n)) + δ
)k
,
(
(1− δ)m(p̂j + 1/n) + δ
(1− δ)mp̂j + δ
)k)
,
≤ max
(
(1− δ)m(1/n)
(1− δ)m(p̂j − (1/n)) + δ + 1
)k
≤
(
(1− δ)m
nδ
+ 1
)k
,
where the maximum is achieved when p̂j(Y ) = 1/n and p̂j(X) = 0, given a fixed set of
parameters m,n, δ.
Thus we have
sup
x∈([0,1]r,...,[0,1]r)
f̂(x)
ĝ(x)
≤
(
(1− δ)m
nδ
+ 1
)k
,
and the theorem holds. 
9.5 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Recall that F̂Z denotes the empirical distribution function corresponding to Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk),
where Zi ∈ [0, 1]r for all i are i.i.d. draws from density function f̂m,δ(x) as in (5) given X =
(X1, . . . , Xn). LetU denote the uniform cdf on [0, 1]r. GivenX = (X1, . . . , Xn) drawn from a dis-
tribution whose cdf is F , let f̂m denote the histogram estimator on X and let F̂m(x) =
∫ x
0
f̂m(s)ds
and F̂m,δ(x) = (1− δ)F̂m(x) + δU(x). Define Fm(x) = E(F̂m(x)) and f¯m(x) = E(f̂m(x)).
The Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension of the class of sets of the form {(−∞, x1] × · · · ×
(−∞, xr] is r and so by the standard Vapnik-Chervonenkis bound, we have for ǫ > 0 that
P
(
sup
t∈[0,1]r
|F̂X(t)− F (t)| > ǫ
)
≤ 8nr exp
{
−nǫ
2
32
}
≤ exp
{
−nǫ
2
64
}
(18)
for large n. Hence, E supt∈[0,1]r |F̂X(t)− F (t)| = O
(√
r logn
n
)
. Given X , we have Z1, . . . , Zk ∼
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F̂m,δ and so E sup[0,1]r |F̂Z(t)− F̂m,δ(t)| = O
(√
r log k
k
)
. Thus,
E sup
x∈[0,1]r
∣∣∣F̂Z(x)− F (x)∣∣∣ ≤ E sup
x
|F̂Z(x)− F̂m,δ(x)|+ E sup
x
|F̂m,δ(x)− F (x)|
≤ E sup
x
|F̂Z(x)− F̂m,δ(x)|+ E sup
x
|F̂m(x)− F (x)|+ δ
≤ E sup
x
|F̂Z(x)− F̂m,δ(x)|+ E sup
x
|F̂m(x)− F (x)|+ δ
= O
(√
r log k
k
)
+ E sup
x
|F̂m(x)− F (x)|+ δ.
By the triangle inequality, we have for all x ∈ [0, 1]r,
∣∣∣F̂m(x)− F (x)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣F̂m(x)− Fm(x)∣∣∣+ |Fm(x)− F (x)| ,
and hence
E sup
x∈[0,1]r
∣∣∣F̂m(x)− F (x)|∣∣∣ ≤ E sup
x∈[0,1]r
∣∣∣F̂m(x)− Fm(x)∣∣∣+ E sup
x∈[0,1]r
|Fm(x)− F (x)|
= O
(√
r log n
n
)
+ E sup
x∈[0,1]r
|Fm(x)− F (x)| (19)
where the last step follows from the VC bound as in (18) for Fm(x).
Next we bound supx∈[0,1]r |Fm(x)− F (x)|. Now F (x) = P (A) where A = {(s1, . . . , sr) :
si ≤ xi, i = 1, . . . , r}. If x = (j1h, . . . , jrh) for some integers j1, . . . , jr then F (x)− Fm(x) = 0.
For x not of this form, let x˜ = (j1h, . . . , jrh) where ji = ⌊xi/h⌋. Let R = {(s1, . . . , sr) : si ≤
x˜i, i = 1, . . . , r}. So
F (x)− Fm(x) = P (A)− Pm(A) = P (R)− Pm(R) + P (A \R)− Pm(A \R)
= P (A \R)− Pm(A \R) (20)
where Pm(B) =
∫
B
dFm(u) and the set A \ R intersects at most rh/hr number of cubes in
{B1, . . . , Bm}, given that Vol(A \ R) ≤ 1 − (1 − h)r ≤ rh. Now by the Lipschitz condition (4),
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we have supx∈[0,1]r |p(x)− f¯m(x)| ≤ Lh
√
r and
|P (A \R)− Pm(A \R)|
≤ number of cubes intersecting(A \R)×maximum density discrepancy × volume of cube
≤ (rh/hr) · (Lh√r) · hr ≤ Lr3/2m−2/r. (21)
Thus we have by (19), (20) and (21)
E sup
x
|F̂m(x)− F (x)| = O
(√
r log n
n
)
+ Lr3/2m−2/r. (22)
Hence,
E sup
x
|F̂Z(x)− F (x)| = O
(√
r log k
k
)
+O
(√
r log n
n
)
+ Lr3/2m−2/r + δ.
Set m ≍ nr/(6+r), k ≍ m4/r = n4/(6+r) and δ = (mk/nα) we get for all n large enough,
E supx |F̂Z(x)− F (x)| = O
( √
logn
n2/(6+r)
)
. 
9.6 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Let f̂Z be the histogram based on Z as in (8). Then
(f̂Z(u)− p(u))2  (1− δ)2(p(u)− f̂m(u))2 + δ2(p(u)− 1)2 + (f̂m,δ(u)− f̂Z)2
where  means less than, up to constants. Hence,
E
∫
(f̂Z(u)− p(u))2du  Rm + δ2 + E
∫
(f̂m,δ(u)− f̂Z(u))2du
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where Rm is the usual L2 risk of a histogram under the Lipschitz condition (4), namely, m−2/r +
m/n. Conditional on X , f̂Z is an unbiased estimate of f̂m with integrated variance m/k. So,
E
∫
(f̂Z(u)− p(u))2du  m−2/r + m
n
+ δ2 +
m
k
.
Minimizing this, subject to (6) yields
m ≍ nr/(2r+3), k ≍ n(r+2)/(2r+3), δ ≍ n−1/(2r+3)
which yields E
∫
(f̂Z(u)− p(u))2du = O(n−2/(2r+3)). 
9.7 Proof of Theorem 4.4
(1) Note that p− f̂Z = p− f˜ + f˜ − f̂Z = p− f˜ +OP
(
m
k
)
. When k ≥ n, the latter error is lower
order than the other terms and may be ignored. Now,
p(x)− f˜(x) = p(x)− f̂m(x) + f̂m(x)− f˜(x).
Thus ∫
(p(x)− f˜(x))2dx 
∫
(p(x)− f̂m(x))2dx+
∫
(f̂m(x)− f˜(x))2dx.
The expected value of the first term is the usual risk, namely, O(m−2/r +m/n).
For the second term, we proceed as follows. Let p̂j = Cj/n and
q̂j =
(Cj + νj)+∑m
s=1(Cs + νs)+
.
We claim that
max
j
|q̂j − p̂j | = O
(
logm
n
)
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almost surely, for all large n. We have
q̂j =
(Cj + νj)+
n
(
n∑m
s=1(Cs + νs)+
)
=
(Cj + νj)+
n
1
Rn
where Rn = (
∑m
s=1(Cs + νs)+)/n. Now
p̂j − |νj|
n
≤ p̂j + νj
n
=
(Cj + νj)
n
≤ (Cj + νj)+
n
≤ p̂j + |νj |
n
.
Therefore, ∣∣∣∣(Cj + νj)+n − p̂j
∣∣∣∣ ≤ |νj |n ≤ Mn
where M = max{|ν1|, . . . , |νm|}. Let A > 0. The density for νj has the form f(ν) = (β/2)e−β|ν|.
So,
P(M > A logm) ≤ mP(|νj | > A logm) = βm
∫ ∞
A logm
e−β|ν|dν =
1
mAβ−1
.
By choosing A large enough we have that M < A logm a.s. for large n, by the Borel-Cantelli
lemma. Therefore, ∣∣∣∣(Cj + νj)+n − p̂j
∣∣∣∣ ≤ logmn
Now we bound Rn. We have
1−
∑
s |νs|
n
≤ 1 +
∑
s νs
n
≤ Rn =
∑m
s=1(Cs + νs)+
n
≤ 1 +
∑
s |νs|
n
so that
|Rn − 1| ≤
∑
s |νs|
n
≤ Mm
n
= O
(
m logm
n
)
a.s.
Therefore, 1/Rn = (1 +O(m logm/n)) and thus
q̂j =
(
p̂j +O
(
logm
n
)) (
1 +O
(
m logm
n
))
= p̂j + p̂j O
(
m logm
n
)
+O
(
logm
n
)
+O
(
m(logm)2
n2
)
.
26
Next we claim that p̂j = O(1/m) a.s. To see this, note that pj ≤ C/m, by definition of C:
1 ≤ C = supx p(x) <∞. Hence, by Bernstein’s inequality,
P
(
p̂j >
2C
m
)
= P
(
p̂j − pj > 2C
m
− pj
)
≤ exp
{
−1
2
n((2C/m)− pj)2
pj +
1
3
((2C/m)− pj)
}
≤ exp
{
−1
2
nC2/m2
(4C/3m)
}
= e−3nC/(8m) ≤ 1
n2
for all n ≥ 16m log n/3C; Thus p̂j = O(1/m) a.s. for all large n. Thus, q̂j − p̂j = O(logm/n)
almost surely for all large n. Hence,
E
∫
(f̂m(x)− f˜(x))2dx = O
(
m logm
n
)2
.
So the risk is
O
(
m−2/r +
m
n
+
(
m logm
n
)2)
= O
(
m−2/r +
m
n
)
,
for n ≥ m log2m. This is the usual risk. Hence, we can choose m ≍ nr/(2+r) to achieve risk
n−2/(2+r) for all n large enough.
(2) Let F̂m be the cdf based on the original histogram and let F˜m be the cdf based on the
perturbed histogram. We have
E sup
x
|F (x)− F̂Z(x)| ≤ E sup
x
|F (x)− F̂m(x)|+ E sup
x
|F̂m(x)− F˜m(x)|+ E sup
x
|F˜m(x)− F̂Z(x)|
≤ E sup
x
|F (x)− F̂m(x)|+ E sup
x
|F̂m(x)− F˜m(x)|+O
(√
r log k
k
)
.
Since we may take k as large as we like, we can make the last term arbitrarily small. From (22),
E sup
x
|F (x)− F̂m(x)| = O
(√
r log n
n
)
+ Lr3/2m−2/r.
Let f̂(x) = h−r
∑m
j=1 p̂jI(x ∈ Bj) and Let f˜(x) = h−r
∑m
j=1 q̂jI(x ∈ Bj). Let x′ =
(u1h, . . . , urh) where ui = ⌈xi/h⌉, ∀i = 1, . . . , r. Recall that B1, . . . , Bm are the m bins of
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X with sides of length of h. Let Bx denote the cube with the left-most corner being 0 and the
right-most corner being x. Then for all x, we have
∣∣∣F̂m(x)− F˜m(x)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∫ x
0
f̂(s)− f˜(s)ds
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ x
0
∣∣∣f̂(s)− f˜(s)∣∣∣ ds
≤
∫ x′
0
∣∣∣f̂(s)− f˜(s)∣∣∣ ds
=
∑
ℓ:Bℓ⊆Bx′
|p̂ℓ − q̂ℓ| ≤
m∑
ℓ=1
|p̂ℓ − q̂ℓ|
where we use the fact that there are at most m cubes. Hence,
E sup
x∈[0,1]r
|F̂m(x)− F˜m(x)| ≤ m logm
n
where we use the fact that maxj |p̂j − q̂j | = O(logm/n) a.s. So,
E sup
x
|F (x)− F̂Z(x)| = O
(√
r logn
n
)
+ Lr3/2m−2/r +O
(
m logm
n
)
.
Setting m ≍ nr/(2+r) yields
E sup
x
|F (x)− F̂Z(x)| = O
(
min
(
log n
n2/(2+r)
,
√
logn
n
))
Hence for r = 1, the rate is O
(√
logn
n
)
. For r ≥ 2, the rate is dominated by the first term inside
O(), and hence the rate is O
(
logn× n−2/(2+r)). 
9.8 Proof of Theorem 5.3
Let Bǫ =
{
u = (u1, . . . , uk) : ρ(F, F̂u) ≤ ǫ
}
where F̂u is the empirical distribution based
on u = (u1, . . . , uk) ∈ X k. Also, let An = {ρ(F̂X , F ) ≤ ǫn/16}. For notational simplicity set
28
∆ = ∆n,k. Then
P
(
ρ(F, F̂Z) > ǫn
)
= P
(
ρ(F, F̂Z) > ǫn, An
)
+ P
(
ρ(F, F̂Z) > ǫn, A
c
n
)
≤ P
(
ρ(F, F̂Z) > ǫn, An
)
+ P (Acn)
= P
(
ρ(F, F̂Z) > ǫn, An
)
+O
(
1
nc
)
. (23)
By the triangle inequality ρ(F̂u, F̂X) ≥ ρ(F̂u, F )− ρ(F̂X , F ). Then,
∫
Bcǫ
gx(u)du =
∫
Bcǫ
exp
(
−αρ(F̂X , F̂u)
2∆
)
du
≤
∫
Bcǫ
exp
(
−α(ρ(F̂u, F )− ρ(F̂X , F ))
2∆
)
du
= exp
(
αρ(F̂X , F )
2∆
)∫
Bcǫ
exp
(
−αρ(F̂u, F )
2∆
)
du
≤ exp
(
αρ(F̂X , F )
2∆
)
exp
(−αǫ
2∆
)∫
Bcǫ
du
≤ exp
(
αρ(F̂X , F )
2∆
)
exp
(−αǫ
2∆
)
.
By the triangle inequality, we also have ρ(F̂u, F̂X) ≤ ρ(F̂u, F ) + ρ(F̂X , F ) and
∫
gx(u)du ≥
∫
Bǫ/2
gx(u)du =
∫
Bǫ/2
exp
(
−αρ(F̂X , F̂u)
2∆
)
du
≥ exp
(
−αρ(F̂X , F )
2∆
)∫
Bǫ/2
exp
(
−αρ(F, F̂u)
2∆
)
du
≥ exp
(
−αρ(F̂X , F )
2∆
)
exp
(−αǫ
4∆
)∫
Bǫ/2
du
= exp
(
−2αρ(F̂X , F )− αǫ
4∆
)∫
Bǫ/2
p(u1) · · · p(uk)
p(u1) · · · p(uk)du
≥
exp
(
−2αρ( bFX ,F )−αǫ
4∆
)
(supx p(x))
k
P
(
ρ(F, Ĝ) ≤ ǫ/2
)
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where Ĝ is the empirical cdf from a sample of size k drawn from P . Thus we have
∫
Bcǫ
h(u|x)du ≤
(supx p(x))
k exp
(
αρ( bFX ,F )
∆
)
exp
(−αǫ
4∆
)
P
(
ρ(F, Ĝ) ≤ ǫ/2
) .
Thus, from (23),
P
(
ρ(F, F̂Z) > ǫ
)
≤ P
(
ρ(F̂X , F ) ≥ ǫ
16
)
+
(supx p(x))
k exp
(−3αǫ
16∆
)
P
(
ρ(F, Ĝ) ≤ ǫ/2
)
=
(supx p(x))
k exp
(−3αǫ
16∆
)
P
(
ρ(F, Ĝ) ≤ ǫ/2
) +O( 1
nc
)
.
Thus the theorem holds. 
9.9 Proof of Lemma 5.1
Proof of Lemma 5.1. We start with KS, By the triangle inequality, we have for all z ∈ X k and
for all x, y ∈ X n,
∣∣∣ρ(F̂x, F̂z)− ρ(F̂y, F̂z)∣∣∣ ≤ ρ(F̂x, F̂y).
Notice that changing one entry in x will change F̂x(t) by at most 1n at any t by definition, that is,
sup
t∈[0,1]r
|F̂x(t)− F̂y(t)| = 1
n
.
Thus the conclusion holds for the KS-distance. 
9.10 Proof of Theorem 5.4
We need the following small ball result; see Li and Shao (2001).
Theorem 9.1. Let r ≥ 3, and {Xt, t ∈ [0, 1]r} be the Brownian sheet. Then there exists 0 < Cr <
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∞ such that for all 0 < ǫ ≤ 1,
log P
(
sup
t∈[0,1]r
|Xt| ≤ ǫ
)
≥ −Crǫ−2 log2r−1(1/ǫ)
where Cr depends only on r. The same bound holds for a Brownian bridge.
Proof of theorem 5.4. The Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension of the class of sets of the
form {(−∞, x1] × · · · × (−∞, xr] is r and so by the standard Vapnik-Chervonenkis bound, we
have for ǫn, kn as specified in the theorem statement,
P
(
sup
[0,1]r
|F̂X(t)− F (t)| > ǫn
16
)
≤ 8nr exp
{
−n(ǫn/16)
2
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}
≤ 8 exp
{
−c5
(
B
3α
)2/3
n1/3 + r logn
}
= 8 exp
{
−c6
√
kn
(
B
3α
)
+ c7r log kn
}
= 8 exp
{
−C2
√
kn
(
B
3α
)}
(24)
for some constants c5, c6, c7, C2 > 0 for n large enough. Thus (10) holds. Now we compute the
small ball probability. Note that
√
k(F̂k − F ) converges to a Brownian bridge Bk on [0, 1]r. More
precisely, from Cso¨rgo˝ and Re´ve´sz (1975) there exist a sequence of Brownian bridges Bk such that
sup
t
|
√
k(F̂k − F )(t)− Bk(t)| = O
(
(log k)3/2
kγ
)
a.s. (25)
where γ = 1/(2(r+1)). It is clear that the RHS of (25) is o(1) a.s. given a fixed r. Hence we have
for k = kn and ǫn as chosen in the theorem statement, and for all ǫ ≥ ǫn, it holds that
logP(sup
t
|F̂Z(t)− F (t)| ≤ ǫ/2) = log P(sup
t
√
k|F̂Z(t)− F (t)| ≤
√
kǫ/2)
≥ log P
(
sup
t
|Bk(t)| ≤
√
kǫ−O (k−γ(log k)3/2)) (26)
≥ log P
(
sup
t
|Bk(t)| ≤
√
kǫ
4
)
(27)
31
for all large n, where (26) follows from (25) and (27) holds given that
√
kǫ ≥ √knǫn ≥ c for some
constant c > 1/2 due to our choice of kn and ǫn. Also, ∆ ≤ 1/n for KS distance. Hence, by
Theorem 5.3 and (24), we have for B = log supx p(x) > 0,
P
(
ρ(F, F̂Z) > ǫn
)
≤ C0 exp
{
−n
(
3αǫn
16
− Bkn
n
− C1| log(
√
knǫn/4)|2r−1
nknǫ2n
)}
+ 8 exp
{
−C2B
√
kn
3α
}
≤ C0 exp(−C3Bkn/2) + 8 exp
{
−C2
(
B
3α
)√
kn
}
→ 0 (28)
for some constantsC0, C1, C2 andC3, where (28) holds when we take w.l.o.g. kn = 116
(
3α
B
)2/3
n2/3
and ǫn ≥ 2
(
B
3α
)1/3
n−1/3, given that ǫn ≥ 2
(
B
3α
)1/3
n−1/3 = 32knB
3nα
and hence 3αǫn
16
≥ 2Bkn
n
. Thus
the result follows. 
Remark 9.2. The constants taken in the proof are arbitrary; indeed, when we take kn = C4
(
3α
B
)2/3
n2/3
and ǫn = 32C4
(
B
3α
)1/3
n−1/3 with some constant C4 ≥ 1/16, (28) will hold with slightly different
constants C2, C3. For kn and ǫn as chosen above, it holds that
√
knǫn ≍ 1.
9.11 Proofs for Lemma 6.1 and Theorem 6.2
Throughout this section, we let p̂X denote the estimator as defined in (14), which is based on a
sample of size n drawn independently from F ; Similarly, we let p̂k denote the same estimator
based on an i.i.d. sample (Y1, . . . , Yk) of size k drawn from F , with mk = k1/(2γ+1) replacing mn
and β̂j = k−1
∑k
i=1 ψj(Yi) in (14). We let p̂Z denote the estimator as in (16), based on an i.i.d.
sample Z = (Z1, . . . , Zk) of size k drawn from gx(z) as in (17).
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Without loss of generality, let X = (x,X2, . . . , Xn) and Y =
(y,X2, . . . , Xn) so that δ(X, Y ) = 1 and let Z ∈ X k. Recall that
ξ(X,Z) =
(∫
(p̂X(x)− p̂Z(x))2 dx
)1/2
,
ξ(Y, Z) =
(∫
(p̂Y (x)− p̂Z(x))2 dx
)1/2
.
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In particular, let us define u = p̂X − p̂Z and v = p̂Y − p̂Z and thus
|ξ(X,Z)− ξ(Y, Z)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
(∫
(p̂X(x)− p̂Z(x))2 dx
)1/2
−
(∫
(p̂Y (x)− p̂Z(x))2 dx
)1/2∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣‖u‖ℓ2 − ‖v‖ℓ2∣∣ ≤ ‖u− v‖ℓ2
= ‖p̂X − p̂Z − (p̂Y − p̂Z)‖ℓ2 = ‖p̂X − p̂Y ‖ℓ2 ≤
2c20mn
n
,
where the first inequality is due to the triangle inequality for the ‖.‖ℓ2 and the last step is due to
|p̂X(x)− p̂Y (x)| = 1
n
∣∣∣∣∣
mn∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
ψj(Xi)−
n∑
i=1
ψj(Yi)
)
ψj(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
n
∣∣∣∣∣
mn∑
j=1
(ψj(X1)− ψj(Y1))ψj(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
n
mn∑
j=1
(|ψj(X1)|+ |ψj(Y1)|)|ψj(x)| ≤ 2c
2
0mn
n
.
Hence ∆ ≤ 2c20mn
n
. 
Proof of Theorem 6.2. For u = (u1, . . . , uk) ∈ X k, we let
p̂u(x) = 1 +
mk∑
j=1
β̂jψj(x),
where mk = k
1
2γ+1 and β̂j = k−1
∑k
i=1 ψj(ui).
Let F̂u be the empirical distribution based on u. Our proof follows that of Theorem 5.3, with
ρ(F, F̂u) = ‖p− p̂u‖ℓ2 and ρ(FX , F̂u) = ‖p̂X − p̂u‖ℓ2
as defined in (15) for X = (X1, . . . , Xn). Now
Bǫ =
{
u = (u1, . . . , uk) : ‖p− p̂u‖ℓ2 < ǫ
}
.
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Thus the corresponding triangle inequalities that we use to replace that in Theorem 5.3 are:
‖p̂u − p̂X‖ℓ2 ≥ ‖p̂u − p‖ℓ2 − ‖p̂X − p‖ℓ2 and
‖p̂u − p̂X‖ℓ2 ≤ ‖p̂u − p‖ℓ2 + ‖p− p̂X‖ℓ2 .
Standard risk calculations show that (10) holds for some c > 0 with ρ(F, F̂X) being replaced with
‖p̂X − p‖ℓ2 . That is, by Markov’s inequality,
P(‖p̂X − p‖ℓ2 > ǫ) ≤
E ‖p̂X − p‖2ℓ2
ǫ2
and (10) follows from the polynomial decay of the mean squared error E||p̂X − p||2. Thus, from
(23), for p̂Z = p̂∗ as in (16),
P
(‖p− p̂Z‖ℓ2) > ǫ) ≤ P(‖p̂X − p‖ℓ2 ≥ ǫ16)+ (supx p(x))k exp
(−3αǫ
16∆
)
P
(‖p− p̂k‖ℓ2 ≤ ǫ/2)
=
(supx p(x))
k exp
(−3αǫ
16∆
)
P
(‖p− p̂k‖ℓ2 ≤ ǫ/2) +O
(
1
nc
)
.
We need to compute the small ball probability. Recall that p̂k denote the estimator based on a
sample of size k. By Parseval’s relation,
∫
(p(x)− p̂k(x))2dx =
mk∑
j=1
(β̂j − βj)2 +
∞∑
mk+1
β2j ≤
mk∑
j=1
(β̂j − βj)2 + ck−2γ/(2γ+1).
Let Ui = (ψ1(Xi)−β1, . . . , ψmk(Xi)−βmk)T and Yi = Σ−1/2k Ui where Σk is the covariance matrix
of Ui. Hence, Yi has mean 0 and identity covariance matrix. Let λk denote the largest eigenvalue
of Σk. From Lemma 9.3 below, λ = lim supk→∞ λk < ∞. Let Q =
∑mk
j=1(β̂j − βj)2 and let
S = k−1/2
∑k
i=1 Yi. Then, for all large k, and any δ > 0,
P(Q ≤ δ2) = P(STΣkS ≤ kδ2) ≥ P
(
STS ≤ kδ
2
λk
)
≥ P
(
STS ≤ kδ
2
2λ
)
.
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From Theorem 1.1 of Bentkus (2003) we have that
sup
c
∣∣P (STS ≤ c)− P(χ2mk ≤ c)∣∣ = O
(√
m3k
k
)
= O
(
k−(γ−1)/(2γ+1)
)
.
Next we use the fact (see Rohde and Duembgen (2008) for example) that P(χ2m ≤ m + a) ≥
1− e−a2/(4(m+a)). Let k = √n, ǫn = c1n−γ/(2γ+1) where c1 ≥ 4(2λ+ 1)(C2 + 1)
a =
k(ǫn/4− C2k−2γ/(2γ+1))
2λ
−mk ≥ (C2 + 1)n1/2(2γ+1) −mk ≥ C2mk,
since mk = k
1
2γ+1 = n1/2(2γ+1). We see that for all large k
P
(
‖p− p̂k‖ℓ2 ≤
√
ǫn
2
)
= P
(∫
(p(x)− p̂k(x))2dx ≤ ǫn
4
)
≥ P
(
mk∑
j=1
(β̂j − βj)2 ≤ ǫn
4
− C2k−2γ/(2γ+1)
)
= P
(
χ2mk ≤
k(ǫn/4− C2k−2γ/(2γ+1))
2λ
)
−O (k−(γ−1)/(2γ+1))
≥ 1− exp
( −a2
4(mk + a)
)
− O (k−(γ−1)/(2γ+1))
≥ 1
2
− O (k−(γ−1)/(2γ+1)) .
Hence
P
(‖p− p̂Z‖ℓ2) > √ǫn) ≤ P(‖p̂X − p‖ℓ2 ≥ √ǫn16
)
+
(supx p(x))
k exp
(
−3α√ǫn
16∆
)
P
(‖p− p̂k‖ℓ2 ≤ √ǫn/2)
=
(supx p(x))
k exp
(
−3α√ǫn
16∆
)
P
(‖p− p̂k‖ℓ2 ≤ √ǫn/2) +O
(
1
nc
)
≤
(supx p(x))
k exp
(
−3αn√ǫn
32c20mn
)
P
(‖p− p̂k‖ℓ2 ≤ √ǫn/2) +O
(
1
nc
)
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and so for γ > 1,
P(
∫
(p̂Z − p)2 ≤ ǫn) ≤ c2 exp
(
k log sup
x
p(x)
)
exp
( −3√c1αn
n1/(2γ+1)nγ/2(2γ+1)
)
= c2 exp
(
n1/2 log sup
x
p(x)− αc3n(
3γ
2(2γ+1) )
)
= c2 exp
(
−αc4n(
3γ
2(2γ+1) )
)
→ 0,
as n→∞ since 3γ
2(2γ+1)
> 1/2, where c2, c3, c4 are some constants. Hence the theorem holds. 
Lemma 9.3. Let λ = lim supk→∞ λk. Then λ <∞.
Proof. Recall that the orthonormal basis is ψ0, ψ1, . . . , where ψ0 = 1 and ψj(x) =
√
2 cos(πjx).
Also p(x) = 1 +
∑∞
j=1 βjψj(x) and
∑
j β
2
j j
2γ < ∞. Note that ∑∞j=1 |βj |k = O(1) for k ≥ 1;
see Efromovich (1999). Note that Σk is the covariance matrix of β̂ times n. We will use the
standard identities cos2(u) = (1 + cos(2u))/2 and cos(u) cos(v) = cos(u−v)+cos(u+v)
2
. It follows
that ψ2j (x) = 1 + 1√2ψ2j(x) and ψj(x)ψk(x) =
ψj−k(x)+ψj+k(x)√
2
. Now E(β̂j) = βj . And
nVar(β̂j) = Var(ψj(X)) =
∫
ψ2j (x)p(x)dx− β2j .
Now
∫
ψ2j (x)p(x)dx =
∫
ψ2j (x)(1 +
∑∞
ℓ=1 βℓψℓ(x))dx = 1 +
∑∞
ℓ=1 βℓ
∫
ψℓ(x)ψ
2
j (x)dx = 1 +
1
2
∑∞
ℓ=1 βℓ
∫
ψℓ(x)
(
1 +
ψ2j(x)√
2
)
dx = 1 +
β2j√
2
. Thus, Σjj = 1 + β2j√2 − β2j . Now consider j 6= k.
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Then
E(ψj(X)ψk(X)) =
∫
ψj(x)ψk(x)p(x)dx
=
∑
ℓ
βℓ
∫
ψj(x)ψk(x)dx
= βj
∫
ψ2j (x)ψk(x)dx+ βk
∫
ψ2k(x)ψj(x)dx+
∑
ℓ 6=j,k
βℓ
∫
ψj(x)ψk(x)ψℓ(x)dx
=
βj√
2
∫
ψ2j(x)ψk(x)dx+
βk√
2
∫
ψ2k(x)ψj(x)dx
+
1√
2
∑
ℓ 6=j,k
βℓ
∫
(ψj−k(x) + ψj+k(x))ψℓ(x)
=
βj√
2
I(2j = k) +
βk√
2
I(2k = j)
+
βℓ√
2
I(ℓ = |j − k| & j 6= 2k) + βℓ√
2
I(ℓ = j + k)
=
βk√
2
I(2k = j) +
β|j−k|√
2
I(j 6= 2k) + βj+k√
2
=
β|j−k|√
2
+
βj+k√
2
,
where we used the fact that ψ−j(x) = ψj(x) for all j = 1, 2, . . . and
∫
ψj(x)dx = 0 for all j > 0.
So, we have for all j ∈ {1, . . . , p},
p∑
k=1
|Σjk| = |Σjj|+
∑
j 6=k
∣∣∣∣β|j−k|√2 + βj+k√2 − βjβk
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1 +
∣∣∣∣β2j√2
∣∣∣∣ + |βj|∑
k
|βk|+ Σj 6=k
∣∣∣∣β|j−k|√2
∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣βj+k√2
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1 +
∣∣∣∣β2j√2
∣∣∣∣ + (|βj|+√2) ∞∑
k=1
|βk|
= O(1).
Hence, limsupk→∞λmax(Σk) ≤ ‖Σk‖∞ = O(1) and the lemma holds. 
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9.12 Proof of Theorem 6.3
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.4, so we provide a short outline. In particular,
the effect of truncation can be shown to be negligible as in the proof of Theorem 4.4. We have
p − p̂Z = p − q̂ + q̂ − p̂Z = p − q̂ + OP (m/k) and the latter term is negligible for k ≥ n. Now
p − q̂ = p − p̂ + p̂ − q̂. The term p − p̂ is the usual error term and contributes O(n−2γ/(2γ+1)) to
the risk. For the second term,
∫
(p̂− q̂)2 =∑mj=1 ν2j = OP (m/n) = OP (n−2γ/(2γ+1)). 
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